The Global Dimension of the Current Economic Crisis and the Benefits of Alternative Dispute Resolution by Golbert, Rebecca
THE GLOBAL DIMENSION OF THE
CURRENT ECONOMIC CRISIS AND THE
BENEFITS OF ALTERNATIVE
DISPUTE RESOLUTION
Rebecca Golbert*
The Conference on the Economic Crisis and Conflict Resolution, sponsored by
the Saltman Center for Conflict Resolution at the University of Nevada Las Vegas,
William S. Boyd School of Law, concerned the application of mediation and other
forms of cost-effective dispute resolution to specific dimensions of the domestic eco-
nomic crisis—namely foreclosure and bankruptcy.  Among other relevant themes, the
conference also examined cost-effective dispute resolution in community mediation,
online technology, and dispute-wise organizations.  An economic downturn, however,
does not respect borders.  The current economic crisis is no exception.  Thus, I turn
our attention to the global dimension of the current economic crisis, which, like its
domestic counterpart, calls for innovative strategies and approaches to conflict pre-
vention, management, and resolution.
I. THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC CRISIS
The international business community has experienced dramatic growth in
international trade and investment since World War II and particularly over the
last three decades, following the opening of Asian markets.1  A steady rise in
cross-border disputes has accompanied the expansion of international trade and
investment.2  So too, has a burgeoning international legal infrastructure for sup-
porting, managing, and resolving cross-border disputes.3
The disputes arising from international business transactions have grown
increasingly complex and expensive to resolve.4  Moreover, in the current
global economic downturn contractual agreements have grown increasingly dif-
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1 The Honourable J.J. Spigelman, Chief Justice of New South Wales, Address to the 16th
Inter-Pacific Bar Association Conference: Transaction Costs and International Litigation
(May 2, 2006) (transcript available at http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/lawlink/Supreme_
Court/ll_sc.nsf/pages/SCO_spigelman020506).
2 Id.
3 Id.  Spigelman contrasts the “coherent international system for resolving commercial dis-
putes by arbitration” to the “complex, incoherent ‘jungle’ of diverse provisions for interna-
tional litigation.” Id.
4 Id.
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ficult to perform and contract breach appears exceedingly common.5  Thus,
cross-border disputes and their transaction costs have inevitably escalated, even
as the parties tighten their belts and practice increased restraint to weather the
crisis.6  Within this framework, traditional dispute resolution becomes unman-
ageable, a relic of the gilded age when wealthy parties wielded power and lev-
erage in the international domain.
The theme of “non-performance in international commercial contracts”
addressed at a recent conference in Moscow in June 2009, points to the failure
of international businesses investing in developing markets to anticipate the
impact of an economic downturn on their local partners, in this case in Russia.7
Conference organizers advocated for consideration of many models of com-
mercial relations and called for new strategies to resolve commercial disputes
in view of current economic conditions, where non-performance and breach of
contract may be inevitable.8  Why, for example, are contract revision and rene-
gotiation not more common options when economic conditions change the
terms of contract performance?
This Article will analyze systems of conflict prevention, intervention, and
resolution of relevance to the international business community.  This Article
will move top-down, from the most formal and costly dispute resolution proce-
dures to the most informal and cost-effective mechanisms.  Simultaneously, it
advocates for a bottom-up approach that begins with informal prevention and
intervention and ends only with formal dispute resolution.  In this way, this
Article examines the way things are, even as it advocates for how things should
be.
II. TRANSACTION COSTS OF INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION
Parties who choose to resolve their cross-border disputes through interna-
tional litigation take on enormous risks—in monetary costs, duration of time,
representation in foreign courts, unpredictability of outcome, problems of
enforcement, and long-term impact to business relationships.9  In a presentation
entitled Transaction Costs and International Litigation, the Chief Justice of
New South Wales, Australia notes many of these and other costs of interna-
tional litigation:
• Additional layers of complexity.
5 See, e.g., Nicola Berkovic, More Arbitration Work as Credit Crisis Deepens, AUSTRA-
LIAN, Jan. 23, 2009, at 27; Dennis Eng & Albert Wong, Trade Arbitration Cases up 40
Percent as Disputes Rise Amid Global Crisis, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Nov. 20, 2008, at
A3.  Both articles point to an increase in trade disputes arising from contract performance.
6 Spigelman, supra note 1.
7 The International Commercial Arbitration Court: Conferences and Seminars, CHAMBER
COM. & INDUSTRY RUSSIAN FED’N, http://www.tpprf-mkac.ru/en/collaboration-/confsem
(last visited Mar. 1, 2011); The International Commercial Arbitration Court: 4-5 June 2009,
CHAMBER COM. & INDUSTRY RUSSIAN FED’N, http://www.tpprf-mkac.ru/en/component/con-
tent/article/415 (last visited Mar. 1, 2011).
8 The International Commercial Arbitration Court: Conferences and Seminars, supra note
7.
9 Spigelman, supra note 1.
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• Additional costs of enforcement, indeed uncertainty about the ability to
enforce contractual rights.
• Risks arising from unfamiliarity with foreign legal process.
• The risk of unknown and unpredictable legal exposure.10
Indeed, international litigation can easily cost hundreds of thousands of dollars
in legal fees, discovery costs, production and translation of documents, and
appeals.11
The long-term costs from legal exposure, while more difficult to measure
quantitatively, may be more harmful than the monetary risks.  Long-term costs
include revelation of trade secrets, fractured business relationships, and loss of
business reputation.  Unlike arbitration and mediation, judicial proceedings do
not preserve confidentiality of communications.12  A legal dispute concerning
trade secrets may require the revelation of those trade secrets, especially in
“civil law” jurisdictions where in camera proceedings are unknown.13  Simi-
larly, international judicial proceedings and their outcomes occur in the public
domain—risking collateral damage to business reputations and relationships.14
Moreover, cultural, linguistic, jurisdictional, and legal issues arise with
representation in foreign courts and knowledge of foreign legal processes.  Per-
haps most significantly, and in contrast to the international legal framework for
arbitration, international treaties and bilateral agreements do not exist—except
in rare cases—to guarantee the enforcement of foreign judgments.15  The
United States is not a party to any treaty providing for the recognition and
enforcement of foreign judgments.16
10 Id.
11 See, e.g., Peter Sherwin et al., Proskauer on International Litigation and Arbitration,
PROSKAUER, http://www.proskauerguide.com/arbitration/19/I (last visited Mar. 1, 2011).
12 INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION IN NEW YORK 4 (J. Stewart McClendon &
Rosabel E. Everard Goodman eds., 1986).
13 Albert Golbert, The Strange Logic of Japanese Management, 02889-12 CHUO KORON
KEIEI MONDAI 273, 273-74 (1978) (Japan).  This Article contains a description of the man-
ner in which a trade secret can be lost through efforts to protect it when civil law requires
public disclosure.
14 INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION IN NEW YORK, supra note 12, at 4.
15 Id.; see also Spigelman, supra note 1.
16 Steven C. Nelson, Alternatives to Litigation of International Disputes, 23 INT’L LAW.
187, 190 (1989) (“An international dispute is not at an end simply because litigation before a
national court has resulted in a judgment and the parties have exhausted all appeals.  Judg-
ments entered by foreign courts are not entitled to automatic enforcement by American
Courts under the ‘full faith and credit’ clause of the United States Constitution and foreign
courts do not automatically accord such treatment to judgments rendered by American
courts.  Recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments depend on notions of comity and
fairness that are often vaguely and inconsistently articulated.”).  See Hilton v. Guyot, 159
U.S. 113, 118 (1895).  When the EEC (now EU) was negotiating the Brussels Convention on
Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, Sept. 27,
1968, 1998 O.J. (C 27) 1 (consolidated version), the United States sought to reach a similar
treaty with the United Kingdom.  These efforts ultimately failed as the United Kingdom
would not agree to enforce “treble damage” judgments (arising from anti-trust and RICOH
adjudications), and the United States would not sign a treaty without it.  This was the only
serious effort on the part of the United States to negotiate such a treaty.  Ronald A. Brand,
Enforcement of Foreign Money-Judgments in the United States: In Search of Uniformity and
International Acceptance, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 253, 291, 297-98 (1991).
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Given the enormous transactional costs associated with international liti-
gation, and the increased risks to the health and viability of international busi-
nesses in today’s compromised economic environment, why would any party
choose this path of traditional dispute resolution?  International litigation may
arise out of the absence of an effective dispute resolution clause in an interna-
tional agreement.  In other cases, however, parties may deliberately opt for the
resolution of disputes through litigation in a given jurisdiction.  The following
clause taken from the international agreement of an American-Canadian joint
venture, for example, provides solely for litigation:
Section 1.1 Governing Law.
Section 1.2 The law of the State of Delaware shall govern all questions concerning
the construction, validity, interpretation and enforceability of this Agreement, with-
out giving effect to any choice of law or conflict of law rules or provisions (whether
of the State of Delaware or any other jurisdiction) that would cause the application of
the laws of any jurisdiction other than the State of Delaware.  The Partners hereby
irrevocably and unconditionally submit in any legal action or proceeding arising out
of or relating to this Agreement to the exclusive general jurisdiction of the courts
located in New York City, New York and, in any such action or proceeding, consent
to jurisdiction in such courts and waive any objection to the venue in any such
court.17
This joint venture agreement contains no other dispute resolution provisions to
prevent, manage, or resolve disputes arising out of the contract or its
performance.
In the given example, when a dispute did eventually arise, one party to the
joint venture bought out the other party for the value of the enterprise rather
than submit to costly litigation.18  Thus, in the absence of a more comprehen-
sive system for dispute prevention and resolution, consideration of the transac-
tion costs of international litigation may ultimately be approached from a
simple cost-benefit analysis: what are the costs of litigation versus the costs of
concession to avoid litigation?
III. INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION
Several alternatives to litigation—and litigation avoidance in the form of
concession—exist for the resolution of international business disputes.  On a
continuum from formal to informal—though ideally, businesses would move,
conversely, along a continuum from informal to formal—these include: arbitra-
tion; conciliation and mediation,19 informal negotiation and problem solving,
conflict prevention, and collaborative business and law.
This Article begins with international commercial arbitration because it is
the most frequently used alternative to litigation and because it exists within a
17 American-Canadian Joint Venture Agreement (on file with author).
18 Id.
19 Conciliation and mediation are two names for the same or nearly identical process.  I will
use them interchangeably in this Article.  For a more in-depth discussion of perceived differ-
ences and similarities in the international commercial realm, see Rebecca Golbert, A Com-
parison of International Commercial Arbitration and Conciliation Acts, 18 CAL. INT’L L.J.
17, 21-22 (2010).
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highly developed legal framework of international law, rules, and enforcement.
The International Centre for Dispute Resolution (ICDR), which identifies itself
as the largest provider of international dispute resolution services in the world,
provides the following data on its international dispute resolution proceedings
for the last five years:
TABLE 1. ICDR CASELOAD FIGURES20
Caseload 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
International 580 586 621 703 836
Although the ICDR data combines arbitration and mediation, one can safely
assume that the majority of ICDR cases involved arbitration.
The Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (Model Arbitra-
tion Law), adopted in 1985 by the United Nations Commission on International
Trade Law (UNCITRAL), created a uniform legal and procedural framework
for international arbitration proceedings.21  The Model Arbitration Law was
subsequently adopted as a national statute by numerous countries and incorpo-
rated into five U.S. state statutes.22  The Model Arbitration Law and its domes-
tic statutory equivalents resolve several key problems inherent in international
litigation by returning control of the dispute resolution process to the parties
and their representatives.23  Moreover, the 1958 United Nations Convention on
the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York Con-
vention),24 whose provisions are incorporated into the Federal Arbitration Act
(FAA),25 ensures international enforcement of arbitral awards among the 144
signatories to the New York Convention.
The emphasis on and preference for arbitration within the international
dispute resolution community rely on significant merits of international arbitra-
tion over international litigation.  First, the confidentiality of international arbi-
tration proceedings—and, frequently, of arbitral awards—contrasts sharply
20 Personal Correspondence with Christian Alberti, Assistant Vice President, Int’l Ctr. for
Dispute Resolution.
21 G.A. Res. 61/33, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/33 (Dec. 18 2006), available at http://www.unci-
tral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/NY-conv/a61-33-e.pdf.
22 The California International Arbitration and Conciliation Act (California Act) became
law on March 7, 1988. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1297.11-.432 (West 2007).  The Ohio Act
on International Commercial Arbitration and the Oregon International Commercial Arbitra-
tion and Conciliation Act followed the California Act in 1991. OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 2712.01-.91 (West 2006); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 36.450-.558 (West 2003 & Supp.
2010).  The North Carolina International Commercial Arbitration and Conciliation Act and
the Texas Act on the Arbitration and Conciliation of International Commercial Disputes
followed in 1997. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-567.30-.87 (West 2000 & Supp. 2010); TEX. CIV.
PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 172.001-.215 (West 2005).
23 INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION IN NEW YORK, supra note 12, at 3.
24 United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/
texts/arbitration/NY-conv/1958_NYC_CTC-e.pdf.
25 9 U.S.C. § 201 (2006).
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with the public nature of international judicial proceedings.26  Confidentiality
helps to preserve intellectual property, including trade secrets, and to preserve
business relationships and reputations.  Second, parties whose countries are sig-
natories to the New York Convention will likely have their arbitral award rec-
ognized and enforced, making arbitration the obvious choice where the
enforcement of cross-border contractual rights would otherwise be
problematic.27
Third, the Model Arbitration Law and the international institutions pro-
moting arbitration emphasize party autonomy in all realms of the arbitration
process.28  Party autonomy extends to the location of arbitration proceedings,
the choice of party representation in arbitration, the selection of arbitrator(s),
the choice of substantive and procedural law, the rules governing the arbitra-
tion, the language of documents and proceedings, and the logistical framework
for hearings.29  Of course, effective party autonomy in the arbitration process
assumes a comprehensive and clearly articulated arbitration agreement or the
ability to negotiate such arbitration provisions post-dispute.  However, such
optimal conditions often do not exist.30  For example, a flimsy arbitration
clause, lacking in clarity, may frustrate rather than facilitate party autonomy.
Disputes may arise over the meaning and intent of key provisions.  More gener-
ally, the benefits of international arbitration enumerated here rely on an effec-
tive arbitration agreement whose validity cannot be challenged.31
Despite its significant advantages over litigation, international arbitration
has certain disadvantages.  Most significantly, the transaction costs of interna-
tional arbitration continue to rise and mimic litigation costs, growing more and
more prohibitive, particularly in the current economic downturn.32  Like inter-
national litigation, international arbitration proceedings are becoming increas-
ingly complex and may require extensive discovery, production and translation
of documents, and expert witnesses.33  In the case of a poorly written arbitra-
tion agreement, the parties may resort to costly court procedures to clarify and
enforce certain provisions, entangling arbitration with—rather than disentan-
gling it from—the judicial system.  Lengthy proceedings may be further com-
plicated by the logistics of coordinating international travel for hearings for the
parties, counsel, and arbitrator(s).34  Costs and duration only increase when
parties select a panel of three arbitrators rather than a sole arbitrator.35
While the duration and costs of any arbitration proceeding may vary,
ICDR arbitrations are typical.  The ICDR places the average length of its pro-
ceedings at twelve months; the ICDR fee schedule indicates its provider fees
26 INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION IN NEW YORK, supra note 12, at 4.
27 Id.
28 Id. at 3; see also JACK J. COE, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: AMERICAN
PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT 59 (1997).
29 INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION IN NEW YORK, supra note 12, at 3; COE,
supra note 28, at 59.
30 COE, supra note 28, at 56.
31 Id.
32 See Sherwin et al., supra note 11.
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 COE, supra note 28, at 169.
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based on the amount of the claim in dispute.36  For example, the initial filing
fee and final fee add up to $14,200 for a claim between $5,000,000 and
$10,000,000.37  However, those fees do not cover the arbitrator compensation
and expenses, travel costs, legal fees, and costs of discovery, documents, wit-
nesses, or additional court procedures.38  With these additional expenses, the
costs of an arbitration proceeding can escalate quickly.
Of course, as a colleague pointed out with a retort of “not necessarily” in
response to each one of my critiques of arbitration, a well-crafted arbitration
clause can enhance party autonomy to limit the excesses of current arbitration
procedures and thereby produce a more cost- and time-effective arbitration pro-
cess.  Moreover, institutional providers have begun to focus on the barriers to
effective international arbitration and to draft documents that limit the use of
extensive discovery and other costly and time-consuming tactics derived from
litigation.39
Notwithstanding efforts to promote efficiency in international arbitration,
arbitration remains the most formal and time-consuming, and the least collabo-
rative of ADR processes.  In theory, recourse to arbitration indicates that all
other methods of negotiation, problem solving, and dispute intervention have
been explored and have failed.  And yet, most international agreements do not
offer more informal methods but continue to provide for arbitration as the sole
method of dispute resolution.40
IV. EXPANDING THE DEFINITION OF INTERNATIONAL ADR
In the current global economic downturn, it is fundamental to challenge
the over-reliance on arbitration within the international ADR infrastructure.  At
the minimum, international businesses, when faced with disagreements, should
begin with the less formal and more collaborative processes of conciliation and
mediation.  Ideally, the definition of international ADR should be expanded
36 See Personal Correspondence with Christian Alberti, supra note 20; International Dis-
pute Resolution Procedures, AM. ARB. ASS’N, http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=33994#stan-
dard (scroll down to “Standard Fee Schedule”) (last visited Mar. 1, 2011).
37 Id.
38 See id.
39 See, e.g., DEBEVOISE & PLIMPTON L.L.P., PROTOCOL TO PROMOTE EFFICIENCY IN INTER-
NATIONAL ARBITRATION 1 (2010), available at http://www.debevoise.com/arbitration-
protocol/ (follow “View the Protocol” hyperlink); INT’L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE,
TECHNIQUES FOR CONTROLLING TIME AND COSTS IN ARBITRATION (2007), available at http:/
/www.iccwbo.org/uploadedFiles/TimeCost_E.pdf; INT’L INST. FOR CONFLICT PREVENTION &
RESOLUTION, GLOBAL RULES FOR ACCELERATED COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 3 (2009),
available at http://www.cpradr.org/Portals/0/Resources/ADR%20Tools/Clauses%20&%20
Rules/Global%20Rules%20for%20Accelerated%20Commercial%20Arbitration.pdf; INT’L
INST. FOR CONFLICT PREVENTION & RESOLUTION, PROTOCOL ON DISCLOSURE OF DOCU-
MENTS AND PRESENTATION OF WITNESSES IN COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 3 (2009), available
at http://www.cpradr.org/Portals/0/Resources/ADR%20Tools/Clauses%20&%20Rules/CPR
%20Protocol%20on%20Disclosure%20of%20Documents%20and%20Witnesses.pdf.
40 Similarly, institutional providers continue to focus primarily on international commercial
arbitration. See, e.g., Commission on Arbitration, INT’L CHAMBER COM., http://www.
iccwbo.org/policy/arbitration/id2882/index.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2011); Int’l Ctr. for
Dispute Resolution, International ADR, AM. ARB. ASS’N., http://www.adr.org/icdr (last vis-
ited Mar. 1, 2011).
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significantly beyond mediation and arbitration to include informal negotiation
and problem solving, conflict prevention, and collaborative business and law.
A. Mediation and Conciliation
An expanded definition of international ADR should, at the minimum,
place greater emphasis on mediation and conciliation.  Mediation generally
occurs earlier in the course of an international dispute.41  Less formal than arbi-
tration, mediation affords greater party control of the process and outcome and
is thus more collaborative.42  The mediator facilitates the parties’ conversation,
but the parties craft the resulting agreement.43  Thus, mediation generally leads
to more creative solutions and greater party satisfaction.44  It is also more cost
and time-efficient.45  All of these factors make mediation more favorable to the
preservation of business relationships and the improvement of cross-cultural
business communications.
Like arbitration, international mediation and conciliation proceedings
operate within a highly developed international and domestic legal framework.
This framework promotes confidentiality, the stay of judicial and arbitral pro-
ceedings during the course of mediation, and immunity for parties and
mediators in an effort to foster a conducive environment for mediation for the
parties, representatives, and mediators.46  For example, confidentiality provi-
sions protect mediation communications and documentation; however, the level
of confidentiality protection depends on the legal framework chosen to govern
the mediation.47
Mediation and conciliation appear as options for international dispute res-
olution offered by institutional providers such as the ICDR, the International
Chamber of Commerce (ICC), and the International Institute for Conflict Pre-
41 See, e.g., Int’l Ctr. for Dispute Resolution, Guide to Drafting International Dispute Reso-
lution Clauses, AM. ARB. ASS’N., at 2-3, http://www.adr.org/si.asp?id=4945 (last visited
Mar. 1, 2011).
42 KIMBERLEE K. KOVACH, MEDIATION: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 26-27 (3d ed. 2004).
43 Id.
44 Id. at 28.
45 Id.
46 See statutes cited supra note 22.
47 The California Act § 1297.371 offers strong confidentiality protections, later modeled in
other U.S. international arbitration and conciliation statutes. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE
§ 1297.371 (West 2007).  The UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Concil-
iation (Model Conciliation Law), adopted in 2002, provides much weaker confidentiality
protections in Article 9.  G.A. Res. 57/18, art. 9, U.N. Doc. A/RES/57/18 (Jan. 24, 2003),
available at http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N02/538/98/PDF/N0253898.
pdf?OpenElement.  The Uniform Mediation Act (UMA) incorporates the Model Conciliation
Law through amendment but affords greater standards of privilege. See NAT’L CONFERENCE
OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS, UNIFORM MEDIATION ACT prefactory note, §§ 4-6, 8
(2003), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/mediat/2003finaldraft.pdf.
The superior UMA confidentiality provisions thus override the confidentiality provisions of
the Model Conciliation Law, unless parties who opt for the Model Conciliation Law through
the UMA explicitly request (in writing or electronic record) the narrower protections of the
Model Conciliation Law.  For more in-depth discussion of the confidentiality protections of
international mediation and conciliation—comparing the confidentiality provisions of the
California Act with those of other U.S. states, the UMA, and the Model Conciliation Law,
see Golbert, supra note 19, at 23-25.
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vention and Resolution (CPR).48  Nevertheless these institutions continue to
promote arbitration as the primary method for resolving international business
disputes.49  Indeed, the ICDR offers no separate breakdown of its mediation
cases, suggesting that the distinction remains insignificant.
While offering significant advantages to arbitration, mediation remains a
formal process of dispute resolution.  Recourse to mediation, like arbitration,
suggests that the dispute has escalated, that the original contract provisions
failed to clarify the misunderstanding, and that direct negotiation between the
parties and their counsel failed to resolve the problem or conflict.  Moreover,
while international mediation remains more cost-effective than arbitration or
litigation, the transaction costs of international mediation continue to rise, along
with the complexity of disputes being handled through mediation.  Prohibitive
costs include the fee schedules of institutional providers,50 the compensation
and expenses of mediators, legal fees for representation, and the logistics and
travel costs of setting up international mediation proceedings.
International enforcement of mediated settlements also remains problem-
atic.  The ICC thus emphasizes the voluntary nature of mediation and other
“amicable” and “non-binding” dispute resolution techniques under the heading
of ADR, in contrast to “binding” arbitration.51  The Model Conciliation Law
offers weak provisions on enforcement.52  The California Act’s chapter on con-
ciliation claims for a written agreement arising out of conciliation “the same
force and effect as a final award in arbitration.”53  This concept that interna-
tional conciliation agreements be treated as arbitral awards, enforceable by the
New York Convention, has yet to be challenged or upheld in the courts.54
Frequently the first option in a two-tiered dispute resolution clause (medi-
ation then arbitration),55 mediation remains insufficient.  Any such framework
that prioritizes dispute resolution over prevention and intervention is unsatis-
factory in today’s international business environment, where time matters, eco-
nomic pressures mount, and ongoing communication and relationship building
are paramount.
48 For more information on ICDR mediation, see http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=28819.  For
more information on ICC mediation, see http://www.iccwbo.org/court/adr/.  For more infor-
mation on CPR services, inclusive of mediation, see http://www.cpradr.org/Home.aspx.
49 See, e.g., supra note 40 and accompanying text.
50 The ICDR appears to charge the same fees for arbitration and mediation, based on the
amount of the claim. See Personal Correspondence with Christian Alberti, supra note 20.
51 These ICC distinctions between ADR and arbitration are available at the ICC website,
ICC ADR—A Wise Precaution, INT’L CHAMBER COM., http://www.iccwbo.org/court/adr/
id4592/index.html (follow “Expertise,” “Dispute Boards,” and “Docdex” hyperlinks) (last
visited Mar. 1, 2011).  The ADR heading is 85 percent mediation.  Personal Correspondence
with Mathilde Zitaldurand, Int’l Chamber of Commerce (June 2010).
52 Article 14 of the Model Conciliation Law defers to the enacting state for the method of
enforcement.  G.A. Res. 57/18, supra note 47, art. 14.
53 See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1297.401.
54 For further discussion on enforceability, see Golbert, supra note 19, at 25.
55 See, e.g., Int’l Ctr. for Dispute Resolution, supra note 41, at 2-3.
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B. Informal ADR—Continuum of Conflict Prevention and Resolution
International businesses need a greater array of tools to negotiate and
problem-solve in cross-border and cross-cultural commercial relations.  What
are the alternatives to formal dispute resolution in the current economic down-
turn?  Parties to an international agreement sometimes begin the resolution of a
dispute with direct negotiation between business executives and/or their coun-
sel.  Negotiation may be the first of a three-step approach, as in the “CPR Inter-
national Model Multi-step Dispute Resolution Clause”—negotiation, then
mediation, and finally arbitration if necessary.56  This framework, however,
assumes direct negotiation to resolve a dispute.  Examine the following lan-
guage of CPR’s model clause:
The parties shall attempt to resolve any Dispute promptly by negotiation between
executives who have authority to settle the Dispute and who are at a higher level of
management than the persons with direct responsibility for administration or per-
formance of this Agreement.  Any party may give another party written notice of any
Dispute (“Notice”).57
While negotiation is clearly a more informal mechanism than mediation or
arbitration, the language of the clause suggests a formal process—and one that
is not necessarily collaborative—complete with written notice of the “Dispute.”
When direct negotiation between executives fails, the parties move on to formal
dispute resolution with a third-party neutral.
But what if we shift the entire weight of the international ADR framework
from conflict resolution to conflict prevention?  What if we shift from reliance
on formal mechanisms to greater dependency on informal mechanisms for
anticipating and addressing problems in the performance of an international
contract?  A continuum from informal to formal and from conflict prevention to
conflict resolution would explore a wider array of conflict prevention and early
intervention tools before resorting to established methods for the resolution of a
dispute.  The LA Center for International Conciliation and Arbitration
(CICA)58 is an international ADR organization in transition; it seeks to imple-
ment a new paradigm for international ADR, based on a greater focus on infor-
mal and preventative strategies in international business relations.59
56 CPR International Model Multi-step Dispute Resolution Clause, CPR, http://www.
cpradr.org/Resources/ALLCPRArticles/tabid/265/ID/635/CPR-Model-Clauses-and-Sample-
Language.aspx (last visited Mar. 1, 2011).
57 Id.
58 Information on CICA is largely based on personal knowledge and correspondence with
Albert Golbert, Founder of CICA.
59 CICA’s new mission reads: “To provide information and resources to facilitate interna-
tional commercial dispute prevention and resolution.”  CICA aims to develop a website and
programs that reflect its new mission and shifting paradigm.  This is unquestionably a para-
digm shift for international businesses, law firms, and dispute resolution providers, who tend
to think of dispute resolution as separate and distinct from contract negotiations, rather than
as an integral and flexible part of contract negotiation and implementation.  Business execu-
tives and their lawyers frequently insert a model ADR clause into the international agree-
ment, designating a pre-determined method (or two- or three-step method) of formal dispute
resolution in the case of a dispute.  In the context of construction disputes, Michael Pappas
advocates for greater flexibility in the selection of ADR methods, rather than the “‘one size
fits all’ approach.”  Michael Pappas, Essay, A Flexible Framework for the Prevention and
Resolution of Construction Disputes, at 7, http://www.abanet.org/dispute/essay/construc-
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Established in 1986,60 CICA’s founders drafted the California Act with
the aim to make California, and Los Angeles in particular, a hospitable place
for the resolution of international business disputes.61  For more than a decade,
CICA conducted international arbitrations under the procedural framework of
the California Act and its own adaptation of the UNCITRAL Arbitration
Rules.62  It also offered workshops on drafting effective arbitration clauses.
Despite the cutting-edge conciliation chapter of the California Act—that
became a model for other international conciliation acts—CICA conducted few
if any international conciliation proceedings.
Today, in a more competitive climate of international dispute resolution,
dominated by large institutional providers, CICA is undergoing a transforma-
tion of its organizational mission in an effort to complement the work of other
ADR centers and address unmet needs in international commercial relations.
Its new mission would cast CICA as a resource center and clearing house, edu-
cating local and international businesses about effective conflict prevention,
intervention, and resolution.  It would make referrals to other international dis-
pute resolution centers only when informal strategies have been exhausted and
disputes have escalated to a formal level.  What does such a resource center/
clearing house look like in the realm of international ADR?  CICA program-
matic goals and strategies for local and international businesses would ideally
include:
1. Building dispute design into every step of the international business process from
the start of business communications to the end of business relations;
2. Training businesses to think about conflict prevention first, dispute resolution
second;
3. Training businesses to negotiate international contracts with conflict prevention
and intervention in mind, rather than a fixed and narrow model of dispute
resolution;
4. Training businesses in international and cross-cultural communication, negotia-
tion, and problem solving—noting the significance of cross-cultural communica-
tion skills in averting and avoiding cultural and linguistic misunderstandings;
tiondisputes.pdf (last visited Mar. 1, 2011) (2004 honorable mention winner in the graduate
student division of the Boskey Essay Competition).  Pappas’ comments are relevant to inter-
national business negotiations.
60 Initially established as the Los Angeles Center for International Commercial Arbitration,
it became known as the Center for International Commercial Arbitration in Los Angeles.  In
its new formation, reflecting the shift from an emphasis solely on arbitration, it has filed a
fictitious name change to become the LA Center for International Conciliation and Arbitra-
tion.  The Board of Directors acknowledges that this name change imperfectly reflects its
new mission; however, it allows for continuity of the acronym “CICA.”
61 Albert S. Golbert & Daniel M. Kolkey, California’s New International Arbitration and
Conciliation Code, L.A. LAW., Nov. 1988, at 46, 47.
62 The UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, adopted in 1976, provide model procedural rules for
the conduct of adhoc and administered international arbitration proceedings.  G.A. Res. 31/
98, U.N. Doc. A/RES/31/98 (Dec. 15, 1976).  For the original rules, see UNITED NATIONS
COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE LAW, UNICITRAL ARBITRATION RULES (1976), available at
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/1976Arbitration_rules.html.
For the 2010 revised version of the rules, see UNITED NATIONS COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE
LAW, UNICITRAL ARBITRATION RULES (2010), available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/
english/texts/arbitration/arb-rules-revised/arb-rules-revised-2010-e.pdf.
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5. Working with lawyers and businesses on collaborative approaches to interna-
tional business transactions, drawing from collaborative law and business
models;
6. Building models of problem solving into contract performance—noting that
problems of contract interpretation and implementation are almost inevitable but
their resolution is not;
7. Modeling flexible and multi-tiered ADR clauses, emphasizing direct negotiation
and problem solving, informal third-party consultation and early intervention—
such as the role of an Ombudsman—followed by mediation, then arbitration;
8. Building a panel of experts—including informal third-party neutrals, interna-
tional mediators and arbitrators; and
9. Collaboration with other international ADR centers, to establish a smooth contin-
uum of options from dispute prevention to dispute resolution.
In its process of reimagining its mission in the current international eco-
nomic climate, the Board of Directors of CICA seeks clear definitions and
models of conflict prevention and early intervention.  It also strives to identify a
more comprehensive framework for designing dispute prevention and resolu-
tion systems and agreements.  At the Conference on the Economic Crisis and
Dispute Resolution, Michael Colatrella spoke about the elements of a “dispute-
wise” organization in the domestic context; these elements include problem-
solving, early intervention, and negotiation.63  His “dispute-wise” model priori-
tizes informal, collaborative, and cost-effective mechanisms.64  It addresses
both internal and external conflict prevention and resolution systems—that is,
within and between organizations.65  Colatrella argued that a “dispute-wise”
business is far more cost-effective in the current economic climate.66
Borrowing Colatrella’s terminology, how can CICA train international
businesses to become “dispute-wise”?  How should CICA define and model the
many terms of informal and preventative ADR; namely, “conflict prevention
and early intervention,” “informal negotiation and problem-solving,” “collabo-
rative business and law,” and “cross-cultural communication”?  How should
CICA adapt primarily domestic models to the international arena—an arena
that is frequently more complex due to the layering of cultures, languages, legal
systems, and business environments and expectations?  In short, how can CICA
help international businesses to develop effective strategies that anticipate
potential sources of conflict and implement preventative and problem-solving
techniques?  And how far back in the process does such a dispute prevention
model go?67
63 Michael T. Colatrella, Jr., Assistant Professor, McGeorge School of Law, Cutting the
Cost of Conflict by Creating a Dispute-Wise Organization, Presentation at the William S.
Boyd School of Law Conference on Conflict Resolution and the Economic Crisis (Feb. 13,
2010).
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 This last question has plagued discussions among the Board of Directors of CICA.
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V. ADAPTING MODELS OF DISPUTE PREVENTION AND EARLY INTERVENTION
TO THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT
Definitions and models of dispute prevention and early prevention exist in
a number of specific commercial arenas, primarily domestic and, most signifi-
cantly, in the construction industry.68  The construction industry and interna-
tional business have many overlaps—multiple parties, complex negotiations,
complex disputes that can become very expensive to resolve, and the long-
existing use of and preference for arbitration.  Despite the preference for arbi-
tration, the construction industry has moved to the forefront of ADR innovation
in developing models and frameworks to anticipate and avoid disputes before
they arise and to address them quickly and collaboratively when they do.69
This Article will examine three particular models of prevention and inter-
vention prevalent in the construction industry—Assisted Negotiations, Partner-
ing, and Dispute Resolution Boards.70  It appears, for example, that the ICC has
adapted Dispute Resolution Boards to the international context.71  This Article
will also explore CPR’s Early Case Assessment Toolkit, a new and flexible
approach to evaluating and managing disputes in the early stages.  Finally, this
Article will briefly address cross-cultural communication strategies and collab-
orative law approaches, which must be incorporated into any international dis-
pute prevention framework.72
The Construction Industry’s Guide to Dispute Avoidance and Resolution,
published by the American Arbitration Association (AAA),73 offers resources
and services to encourage parties to design and implement “appropriate dispute
avoidance and resolution processes” and clauses for inclusion in contracts.74
68 See, e.g., Am. Arb. Ass’n, The Construction Industry’s Guide to Dispute Avoidance and
Resolution 2 (2007), available at http://www.adr.org/si.asp?id=3839; Pappas, supra note 59,
at 1.
69 See AM. ARB. ASS’N, supra note 68, at 2; Pappas, supra note 59, at 1-2.
70 I want to thank Becky Jacobs, a fellow participant on my panel at the Conference on
Conflict Resolution and the Economic Crisis, for the initial suggestion that I take a look at
partnering agreements in the construction industry as an effective dispute prevention
mechanism.
71 For a brief description of ICC Dispute Boards, see What Are ICC Dispute Boards?, INT’L
CHAMBER COM., http://www.iccwbo.org/court/dispute_boards/id4527/index.html (last vis-
ited Mar. 1, 2011).
72 David Allen Larson, another participant at the Conference on Conflict Resolution and the
Economic Crisis, suggests that Online Dispute Resolution (ODR) and Technology Mediated
Dispute Resolution (TMDR) offer significant opportunities for early and cost-effective inter-
vention in international business disputes.  Larson’s presentation explored the use of robots
and technology in dispute resolution in general.  Their application in international dispute
resolution merits further exploration as to potential benefits and pitfalls.  David Larson, Pro-
fessor, Hamline Univ., Using Technology to Resolve Disputes More Efficiently and Effec-
tively, Presentation at the William S. Boyd School of Law Conference on Conflict
Resolution and the Economic Crisis (Feb. 13, 2010).  For example, while technology could
eliminate the time and expense lost by international travel, it could also exacerbate linguistic
and cultural misunderstandings that face-to-face meetings could avert or resolve.  I do not
explore TMDR or ODR further in this Article but consider them fundamental tools of future
international ADR approaches.
73 AM. ARB. ASS’N, supra note 68.
74 Id. at 6.
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The guide places Assisted Negotiations, Partnering, and Dispute Resolution
Boards in its section on “On-Site Dispute Management Services.”75  It notes
that these processes should occur “in the early stages of a project.”76
A. Assisted Negotiations
The section “On-Site Dispute Management Services” begins with a dis-
cussion of Assisted Negotiations, described as “facilitated negotiations in
which a neutral helps the parties structure their own negotiation” and in which
“a mediator or facilitator may participate in an informal manner to assist in
direct party-to-party discussions.”77  The informal manner of intervention dif-
ferentiates early Assisted Negotiations from later mediation proceedings
involving more formal third-party intervention.  It is worth noting that in cur-
rent international practice, a third-party intervention is rarely informal or con-
sultative but signals the escalation of conflict to formal levels.78  In contrast,
multinational corporations are increasingly using an organizational ombudsman
to intervene informally, impartially, and confidentially in the management of
internal conflicts.79  Ombudsmen, mediators, and facilitators could serve a sim-
ilarly informal and confidential role in the early stages of cross-border misun-
derstandings, disagreements, and disputes.
B. Partnering and Partnering Plus
Partnering begins in the pre-planning stages of a construction project and
provides a collaborative framework for anticipating, identifying, and addressing
risks and problems that could derail the project.80  The Construction Industry’s
Guide defines Partnering as “a commitment by all stakeholders to achieve goals
and objectives agreed upon prior to a project’s commencement.”81  In partner-
ing workshops, a skilled facilitator guides the project’s stakeholders in discus-
sions about goals, agendas, potential risks, appropriate methods of conflict
avoidance, and management.82  The workshops culminate in “a joint agreement
signed by the workshop participants that sets forth their goals and expresses
their commitment to the project.”83
75 Id. at 9-14.
76 Id. at 9.
77 Id.
78 See, e.g., Int’l Ctr. for Dispute Resolution, supra note 41, at 2-3.
79 See, e.g., Corporate Governance: Ombudsman, COCA-COLA ENTERS., http://ir.cokecce.
com/phoenix.zhtml?c=117435&p=irol-govombudsman (last visited Mar. 1, 2011); Office of
ICANN Ombudsman, Creating Dialogue, Affirming Fairness, ICANN, http://www.icann.
org/ombudsman/ (last visited Mar. 1, 2011).
80 AM. ARB. ASS’N, supra note 68, at 9.
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 Id. at 10.  This commitment of stakeholders, articulated in a joint agreement, to work
collaboratively toward mutual project goals shares similarities with Collaborative Law (par-
ticularly Collaborative Family Law), in which the parties and lawyers sign a participation
agreement, before negotiations begin to resolve conflicts and achieve settlement outside the
judicial system. See, e.g., Collaborative Law Offers a No-Court Alternative, CINCINNATI
ACAD. COLLABORATIVE PROFESSIONALS, http://www.collaborativelaw.com/ (last visited Mar.
1, 2011).  Partnering agreements, however, while emphasizing commitment to the shared
goals of the project, do not necessarily make a commitment to out-of-court settlements.
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Partnering Plus expands the traditional Partnering model with certain
innovative design elements produced during partnering workshops at various
phases of the construction project.84  Deliverables include a Risk Management
Plan, Pre-planning Partnering, Communications Plan (means and methods of
communication between parties and public), Partnering, Construction Docu-
ment Review, Identification of Risks to Project Success (referring to environ-
mental and public impact), Dispute Escalation Chart (detailing a step-
negotiation process beginning at lower levels of authority and slowly moving
up the chain of command), and Refinement of On-Site Dispute Resolution
Techniques to Meet Special Needs.85  As the AAA notes, Partnering Plus is
“project-specific” and aims to “provide effective techniques for resolving con-
flicts as they arise on a ‘real-time’ basis.”86
Several key aspects of Partnering and Partnering Plus are relevant to a
more general framework of dispute prevention and clearly transferable to the
international business realm.  Of particular relevance to any project, transac-
tion, or business deal is the involvement of an experienced facilitator in guiding
discussions with stakeholders in the pre-planning and planning stages of a con-
struction project, long before the emergence of disagreements or the need for
dispute intervention.87  As noted above, in international business relations,
third-party intervention often arrives much later in the process, after a dispute
has escalated to formal dispute resolution.88  If third-party intervention were to
begin in the early contract negotiations among the parties, two positive out-
comes could emerge.  First, an impartial facilitator would be intimately
acquainted with the parties, subject matter, and contract and more capable of
averting and addressing problems arising in “real-time.”89  Second, and perhaps
more significantly, the parties, lawyers, and facilitator would have more thor-
oughly considered potential risks and obstacles to the success of the interna-
tional agreement and identified ways to address and resolve them.  For
example, they could generate a risk management plan, partnering agreements, a
dispute-escalation chart, and on-site dispute resolution techniques to establish a
multi-faceted program of dispute avoidance and resolution.  Partnering builds
Nonetheless, the aim of a partnering agreement is certainly to avert disputes or resolve them
early and effectively, which de facto means out-of-court.
84 AM. ARB. ASS’N, supra note 68, at 10-11.
85 Id.
86 Id. at 10.  Thomas Stipanowich also describes the significance of addressing disputes in
“real-time” by taking a “thin-slicing” approach to conflict. See generally Thomas J. Stipa-
nowich, “Thin-Slicing” and Conflict Management: “Real Time” Strategies for Relational
Conflict (Dec. 3, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.mediation-
utrecht.eu/sites/mediation-utrecht.eu/files/thomas-j-stipanowich-thin-slicing-and-conflict-
management.pdf.
87 AM. ARB. ASS’N, supra note 68, at 9-11.
88 See, e.g., Int’l Ctr. for Dispute Resolution, supra note 41, at 2-3.
89 AM. ARB. ASS’N, supra note 68, at 10; Stipanowich, supra note 86.  This begs the ques-
tion: do the facilitators in partnering workshops intervene at later stages of the process?
Pappas’ proposal of a “convenor” seems to fill such a role: “A convenor—a neutral third-
party expert advisor—assists the project team in implementing the system, and provides
continuity throughout the duration of the project.”  Pappas, supra note 59, at 7.  The concept
of the “convenor” thus combines elements of Partnering and Dispute Resolution Boards.
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dispute design into all phases of a project but particularly emphasizes the earli-
est stages of dispute prevention.90
C. DRB’s
Dispute Resolution Boards (DRBs) have existed since the 1970s and are
widespread in construction.91  The presence of the DRB is usually established
in the contract documents.92  A panel of three neutrals, appointed by the par-
ties, forms the DRB and participates in the project team (for smaller projects a
Single Dispute Resolver may perform the functions of a DRB).93  “They attend
periodic meetings, review essential project documents and assist in the identifi-
cation and resolution of issues and potential problems.”94  Similar to a partner-
ing facilitator, the members of the DRB thus become intimately familiar with
the parties, the contract, the subject matter, and potential sources of conflict.
The DRB reviews disputes at an informal hearing and then generally presents a
non-binding recommendation or decision.95  Interestingly, in contrast to media-
tion and arbitration, DRB recommendations are not considered confidential but
“are generally admissible in future proceedings—such as arbitration or litiga-
tion—if the issue is not resolved at the DRB level.”96
To an outside observer, the DRB appears to have the flavor of early non-
binding arbitration, with a three-person tribunal that issues a decision.  How-
ever, in contrast to non-binding arbitration, the DRB intervenes earlier and
more informally and plays a more comprehensive role in the project.97  Among
the list of benefits of DRBs noted by the Dispute Resolution Board Foundation,
the following are particularly significant:
• The DRB is organized at project initiation before any disputes have
arisen.
• The DRB keeps abreast of job developments by means of periodic
review of relevant documents and regular site visits.
• The DRB’s fees and expenses are shared among the parties.
• An informal but comprehensive hearing is convened promptly.98
The admissibility of DRB recommendations as evidence in subsequent arbitra-
tion or litigation is also cited as a positive element, most likely because it con-
tributes to the success of DRBs in settling the dispute.99  However, the
admissibility of DRB recommendations is more problematic from the perspec-
tive of openness and trust-building among the parties.100  DRB members are
also protected from personal or professional liability relating to their DRB
90 AM. ARB. ASS’N, supra note 68, at 9-11.
91 Id. at 12.
92 Id.
93 Id. at 12, 14.
94 Id. at 12.
95 Id.
96 Id.  Is the admissibility of DRB decisions at future proceedings positive or negative?  It
certainly contrasts sharply with the confidentiality protections of mediation and arbitration.
97 See id.
98 Id. at 13.
99 Id.
100 Confidentiality of communications is generally a highly valued element of mediation
and arbitration proceedings.
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duties.101  The California Act in its conciliation chapter similarly offers protec-
tion from liability for the conciliator in his or her professional activities.102
Finally, it is interesting to note that the AAA maintains a separate roster of
qualified DRB neutrals with expertise in DRB processes and in construction
and related fields.103  Related to DRBs and Single Dispute Resolvers, an On-
Site Neutral may function as a mediator or facilitator to assist the parties at the
job site with the management and resolution of problems on a day-to-day basis.
Like DRBs, the On-Site Neutral is intimately involved in the project from the
start; unlike DRBs, he or she does not render decisions or recommendations.104
The ICC also provides for Dispute Boards under the framework of the ICC
Dispute Board Centre, which publishes Dispute Board Rules and model clauses
for international parties to adopt.105  However, the ICC does not administer
Dispute Board proceedings; it only plays a subsidiary role—it may be called
upon to review challenges to Dispute Board decisions.106  Thus, the ICC knows
that parties have adopted ICC Dispute Board Rules and model agreements but
has little other data on the use of Dispute Boards in international business.
Mathilde Zitaldurand of the ICC confirms that the predominant use of ICC
Dispute Boards remains in the field of construction.107  International businesses
in a number of other industries would benefit from the appointment of a Dis-
pute (Resolution) Board and/or an On-Site Neutral at the initiation of an inter-
national agreement—to attend meetings, review documents and
communications, assist in identification and resolution of problems before and
as they arise, and make prompt recommendations in case of dispute.
D. Early Case Assessment Toolkit
The Early Case Assessment (ECA) Toolkit, published by CPR in 2010,
offers another approach to early intervention and management of disputes.108
ECA is an internal process of assessment and fact-finding that does not involve
all the stakeholders to a dispute.  According to the CPR definition the CPR
Early Case Assessment model “calls for a team working together in a specified
time frame to gather the key facts of the dispute, identify the key business
concerns, assess the various risks and costs the dispute poses for the company,
and make an informed choice or recommendation on how to handle the dis-
pute.”109  The emphasis of ECA is not on Early Case Resolution (ECR) per se,
but on informed decision making based on the facts at hand.110  ECA allows
101 AM. ARB. ASS’N, supra note 68, at 13.
102 CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 1297.432 (West 2007).
103 AM. ARB. ASS’N, supra note 68, at 13.
104 Id. at 14.
105 What Are ICC Dispute Boards?, supra note 71.
106 Id.
107 Personal Correspondence with Mathilde Zitaldurand, supra note 51.
108 INT’L INST. FOR CONFLICT PREVENTION & RESOLUTION, CPR EARLY CASE ASSESSMENT
TOOLKIT (2010), available at http://www.cpradr.org/Portals/0/Home/CPRECAToolkit2010.
pdf.
109 Id. at 1.
110 Id.
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the assessment team to customize its response to a given dispute and thereby
select the most appropriate method of management and resolution.111
CPR intends for ECA to be “a flexible tool that may be adjusted” as a case
unfolds and as business concerns change.112  CPR identifies numerous benefits
to implementing Early Case Assessment:
• Enhanced, early case analysis
• Enhanced, early risk identification and analysis
• Enhanced, early evaluation of potential end-game solutions
• Enhanced ability to gauge business needs and solutions, and improved
client relations
• A reduction in legal costs and expenses
• A reduction in settlement and resolution costs
• A reduction in the “claim-through-resolution” cycle time113
Again using Colatrella’s terminology, ECA contributes to the formation of
a “dispute-wise” organization.114  As noted, ECA is an internal process of case
analysis and assessment, which allows businesses to make more informed deci-
sions about appropriate handling of disputes.  ECA is primarily focused on self
and client interest—what are the risks, how do they impact the business and
client, what are possible outcomes and resolutions, and what costs are
involved.115  ECA “arises from the mandate of in-house legal departments to
better and more effectively manage litigation, in terms of outcome and cost,
and to do so with a better calculation of the business interests and objectives
implicated by that litigation.”116  Given the ECA focus on internal perspectives
of the dispute, CPR’s language of “managing litigation,” and the litigation
mindset prevalent in many in-house legal departments, the ECA model alone
does not achieve a paradigm shift from formal dispute resolution to informal
dispute prevention.  However, if used in tandem with other methods of dispute
prevention and intervention, ECA could facilitate an approach to conflict pre-
vention and management that interweaves internal processes of informed and
confident decision making with collaborative methods of negotiation, problem
solving, and informal third-party intervention.
E. Cross Cultural Communication
Cross-Cultural Communication entails more than learning what a culture
does or how it thinks or studying models of culture to achieve “cultural compe-
tence.”117  Often, cross-cultural communication is reduced to classificatory
111 Id.
112 Id. at 2.  A flexible and customized approach is also one of the goals of Partnering/
Partnering Plus and DRBs. See generally AM. ARB. ASS’N, supra note 68, at 9-11.  Pappas
advocates a flexible approach to ADR through use of a convenor and convening session to
tailor the ADR procedure to the given dispute.  Pappas, supra note 59, at 7, 11.
113 INT’L INST. FOR CONFLICT PREVENTION & RESOLUTION, supra note 108, at 2.
114 Colatrella, supra note 63.
115 INT’L INST. FOR CONFLICT PREVENTION & RESOLUTION, supra note 108, at 2.
116 Id.
117 The term “cultural competence” has been applied in the area of medicine and public
health, and more recently organizational management, to ensure improved service delivery
to diverse communities.  While raising cultural awareness, the educational framework of
cultural competence, at times, risks simplifying and essentializing culture. See, e.g., Cul-
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comparisons: high versus low cultures, collectivist versus individualist cultures,
concepts of linear or circular time, differing customs of hospitality, cultural
preferences for direct or indirect negotiations, and social harmony and saving
face in Asian cultures as opposed to a preference for conflict and direct con-
frontation in the West.118  Of course, some knowledge of local cultural practice
and preference is always helpful.  However, cultural knowledge is not generally
quantifiable; it is an interpretive process in search of meaning,119 attuned to the
reality that culture is dynamic and cultural differences affect intercultural com-
munication and understanding.
Cross-cultural communication thus requires thinking about culture and
language as a more fundamental part of the international business process at
every stage.  Culture enters the picture before, during, and after contract negoti-
ations.  Culture affects worldviews, expectations, and goals underlying the bus-
iness relations and negotiations.  It frames the emergence, identification, and
significance of conflict.120  Significantly, it shapes the preference for differing
methods and processes of conflict resolution.121  Differences in language may
exacerbate cross-cultural misunderstandings emerging out of interpretations of
a contract or its performance.  Culture, language, and linguistic and cultural
differences should find voice in a flexible dispute resolution system, where the
parties, lawyers, and third parties constantly check for shared meaning and
establish open channels of communication to clarify misunderstandings.  In
short, cultural difference should be built into the dispute systems design.122
F. Collaborative Law
Collaborative Law (also known as Collaborative Divorce or Collaborative
Practice) is a model drawn from Collaborative Family Law.123  It is commonly
used in cases of amicable divorce.  Collaborative lawyers agree to work col-
laboratively to find resolution and keep a dispute out of the court system.  The
tural Competence, TRANSCULTURAL NURSING, http://www.culturediversity.org/cultcomp.
htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2011); Mark A. King et al., How Is Cultural Competence Integrated
in Education?, CTR. FOR EFFECTIVE COLLABORATION & PRACTICE, http://cecp.air.org/cul-
tural/Q_integrated.htm#def  (last visited Mar. 1, 2011); Toolkit 2: Cultural Competency,
OFFICE FOR INSTITUTIONAL EQUITY, http://www.duke.edu/web/equity/cultural_competency.
pdf (last visited Mar. 1, 2011).
118 Geert Hofstede, in particular, has championed the quantitative comparison (indeed scor-
ing) of national cultures based on certain cultural dimensions.  The Hofstede model of
dimensions of national cultures includes Power Distance, Uncertainty Avoidance, Individu-
alism versus Collectivism, Masculinity versus Femininity, Long- versus Short-Term Orienta-
tion, and Indulgence versus Restraint. See also Dimensions of National Cultures, GEERT
HOFSTEDE & GERT JAN HOFSTEDE, http://www.geerthofstede.nl/culture/dimensions-of-
national-cultures.aspx (last visited Mar. 1, 2011). See generally GEERT HOFSTEDE ET AL.,
CULTURES AND ORGANIZATIONS: SOFTWARE OF THE MIND (3d ed. 2010).
119 CLIFFORD GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES 5 (1973).
120 See, e.g., DAVID W. AUGSBURGER, CONFLICT MEDIATION ACROSS CULTURES: PATH-
WAYS AND PATTERNS 17 (1992).
121 See id. at 21-23.
122 For a more in-depth discussion of culture and conflict resolution, see Rebecca Golbert,
An Anthropologist’s Approach to Mediation, 11 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 81 (2009).
123 For a brief description of Collaborative Family Law, see Collaborative Law Offers a No-
Court Alternative, supra note 83.
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parties and lawyers sign a “participation agreement” before marriage and
divorce negotiations proceed.124  If the parties do not reach settlement through
collaborative means, the collaborative lawyers excuse themselves and transition
the parties to trial lawyers in preparation for judicial proceedings.125
International lawyers and businesses could also take a collaborative oath
and establish a joint agreement to work through contractual problems and
resolve international disputes outside the judicial framework.  A participation
agreement could form part of an international dispute systems design including
Partnering, Dispute Resolution Boards, and other informal prevention and
intervention methods, that, if taken together, would provide multiple channels
of negotiation, problem solving, and third-party intervention before a dispute
could ever reach the courts.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
The LA Center for International Conciliation and Arbitration (CICA)
remains a work in progress.  In its newly crafted mission, it will advocate the
need for international businesses to rethink their approach to conducting busi-
ness and problem-solving inevitable differences with business partners in the
current economic downturn—often before such differences grow into Disputes
in need of resolution.
CICA also aims to become a resource center—alternatively, a think tank
or incubator—for sifting through available dispute prevention and resolution
models and developing best practices to educate international businesses on
effective and flexible dispute systems designs.  Such designs would be heavily
weighted toward informal and collaborative methods of dispute prevention,
intervention, and management—including improved cross-cultural communica-
tion and negotiation skills, informal third-party roles, and an incremental
approach to conflict.  Similarly, CICA would further explore and adapt domes-
tic models of dispute prevention and intervention—including Partnering, Dis-
pute Resolution Boards, On-Site Neutrals, ECA, and Collaborative
Lawyering—in and to the international context.  While focused on best prac-
tices, CICA fully acknowledges that some disputes may ultimately require
more formal methods of dispute resolution.
CICA’s innovative approach to international ADR builds on the common
sense truth that international businesses aim to save their underlying agreement
and preserve their business relationships wherever possible.  This is all the
more the case in a global economic crisis, where business partners and opportu-
nities grow more limited and the risks of financial and emotional loss in a
protracted dispute widen.  A flexible design for dispute prevention and resolu-
tion can accommodate changes on the ground quickly and creatively, including
revision or renegotiation of an international contract when economic conditions
have changed the terms of contract performance.  Astoundingly, prevailing
international ADR approaches remain focused on formal dispute resolution
124 Id.
125 Id.
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mechanisms that accentuate differences over shared needs and interests and
ultimately force parties to take a gamble on the loss of the international rela-
tionship and agreement.
